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Abstract—Hash functions are often used to consistently assign
objects to particular resources, for example to load balancing
in networks. These functions can be randomly selected from a
family, to prevent attackers generating many colliding objects,
which usually results in poor performance. We describe a number
of attacks allowing us to identify which hash function from a
family is being used by observing a relatively small number of
collisions. This knowledge can then be used to generate a large
number of colliding inputs. In particular we detail attacks against
small families of hashes, Pearson-like hash functions and linear
hashes, such as the Toeplitz hash used in Microsoft’s Receive
Side Scaling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hash functions are often used to spread load across several
resources. For example, in the common case of a hash table, a
hash function is used to give a consistent assignment of objects
to linked lists. In modern networking, similar techniques are
used by high-end network cards to assign packets to CPUs [1],
by switches/routers to assign packets to links (e.g. Cisco CEF
load-sharing [2], 802.3 LAG [3] or OSPF ECMP [4]), or by
routers/load balancers to assign flows/requests to servers (e.g.
F5 BigIP hash based load balancing [5]).
In [6], the authors described algorithmic complexity attacks,
where by choosing the inputs to an algorithm, an attacker
could provoke poor performance of an algorithm, rather than
typical performance. Attacks on known hash functions are a
canonical example of this. Attacks can be frustrated by the
use of a randomly selected (keyed) hash function. Typically
these hashes will not be cryptographic hash functions, as
the computational cost associated is too high (e.g. Figure 1).
Consequently, generating collisions once the hash function is
known is not usually computationally expensive.
In this paper we look at attacking such keyed hash functions
in situations where we can determine if two inputs collide,
even though we do not know the actual value of the hash
function. This may be possible in a number of contexts.
1) In the case of a hash table, the length of the hash chains
might be estimated by timing lookups. By sequentially
adding objects and measuring the chain lengths each
time, it may be possible to determine which objects have
been added to the same chain.
2) In the case where the hash is used to assign objects to
a processing resource, such as a CPU or server, then
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Fig. 1. The average cost of hashing an IPv6 flow record with different
algorithms on a selection of CPUs. Xor is a simple per-byte xor; Jenkins is
the hash used in Section II; Pearson is the hash used in Section III; Universal
is a Carter-Wegman hash used from [6]; MD5, SHA and SHA256 are standard
OpenSSL implementations. Results are averaged over a range of hash keys
and records.
we can load one of the resources to produce a change
in response time. After that, we may see which objects
collide by checking their response time.
3) In the case of a device assigning packets to a CPU, we
might send packets back-to-back and look for packet
reordering. Packets going to the same CPU should never
be reordered, whereas packets going to different CPUs
may occasionally be reordered. The chance of reordering
might even be increased by choosing the protocol or
packet size to vary the processing time for the packets.
4) In the case where packets are being load balanced across
links, such as in LAG (link aggregation group) or ECMP
(equal cost multi-path), it may be possible to determine
which flows share a route using a probing tool such as
traceroute (e.g. [7]).
5) In the case of load balancing of more complex services,
such as HTTP or DNS, it may be possible to fingerprint
the assigned server by some higher level mechanism.
The last two attacks, which depend on a clear fingerprint,
are easy to implement while some of the timing attacks might
be more challenging. However, a number of these attacks have
been demonstrated to be feasible. For example, [8] shows a
timing attack against packets sent through a stateful firewall.
The limitations of similar attacks in the face of network jitter
have been studied in [9].
Given that we can test if inputs (say x and y) of a hash
collide (i.e. if h(x) = h(y)), the question we will study is: can
we quickly determine the hash h if we know it is drawn from
some family H . In the following sections we will show that it
is often possible to find h surprisingly quickly. In particular,
we demonstrate how this can be done when the family satisfies
certain general conditions. These conditions include having a
small range of hashes, and having a linear function underlying
the hash (even in the presence of an additional non-linear
layer).
We consider two ways to measure the amount of work
required to determine h and cause collisions. First, we consider
the average number of objects we have to insert to cause
a particular number of collisions. We call this the number
of probe strings (i.e. objects inserted) required to cause L
objects to collide. We also consider the average number of
comparisons, as depending on the exact nature of the attack,
this may be more representative of the work required. We note
that with no information about a hash function with uniformly
distributed output, we require on average KL probe strings to
cause L objects to collide, where K is the number of output
buckets. This blind attack requires no comparisons.
II. SMALL HASH SET
We first consider what happens if the set from which we
select hash functions is relatively small. Suppose we have H
different hash functions which each map to K output buckets.
We are aiming to identify a particular h in use. We may pick
inputs to the hash s1, s2, . . . until we find that h(si) = h(sj).
Using Birthday Paradox arguments, this will require about√
K probe strings and about K comparisons. The attack is
summarised in Algorithm 1.
If H is small enough to enumerate, we then calculate
the subset of all H functions which collide on this set of
strings. We note that h must agree on these colliding strings,
and each of the other hash functions in H will match with
probability 1/K. Thus, we eliminate all but the correct hash
with probability
(
1− 1
K
)H−1
=
((
1− 1
K
)K)H−1K
≈ e−HK .
If we are left with more than one possible hash, we may repeat
this attack until just one hash remains. Even if we do not
reuse information between rounds of this attack, we would
expect to be successful in e
H
K attempts. A more optimistic
attacker that reused information between attempts might hope
to have around HK−n hashes remaining after n attempts, and
so require around logK H attempts to identify h. This suggests
between
√
K logK H and
√
Ke
H
K probe strings or between
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Fig. 2. The average number of probe strings required to determine the hash,
as the number of possible hashes h increases. the number of output buckets
is k = 16 and values shown are averaged over 1000 trials.
K logK H and Ke
H
K comparisons are required for the attack
to identify the hash function.
To demonstrate this, we apply the attack to the keyed
version of Bob Jenkins’s hash from Appendix A.2 of [10].
We evaluate the hash mod 16, so we have 16 output buckets
and vary the range of the initval parameter of the hash.
Figure 2 shows the average number of probe stings we need
to use to recover initval over 1000 different runs, where we
reuse information between collisions. In practice we find the
conservative estimate of the attack’s performance is too conser-
vative. Performance is closer to the crude optimistic estimate,
and can even require fewer probes than expected when the
number of hashes is larger. This is because when more probe
strings are required, multiple collisions with previous strings
become more likely, and each collision provides us with more
opportunities to reduce the number of candidate hashes.
For this attack to be ineffective, we either require K to
be very large or require H to be considerably bigger than K.
Hashes are sometimes keyed by initialising some internal state,
such as a 32-bit integer. In this case we have H = 232, and
this analysis suggests that we should have K much larger (say
K > 264) than H . For many applications, such a large value
of K will be impractical. When H = 232, if collisions can be
found, then an attack that progressively eliminates candidate
hashes is likely to uniquely identify h quickly.
Note, this is similar to the black box attack described in
[8], however they make one comparison per hash function,
rather than finding colliding inputs and then eliminating. As
we have demonstrated, this attack could be used against hashes
such as Bob Jenkins’s hash function [11], which was originally
unkeyed, but variants with small keys have been used in the
Linux Kernel and also suggested in [10].
III. PEARSON-LIKE HASH FUNCTIONS
This section outlines an attack on a hash built from a known
group operation and a unknown permutation (effectively the
Algorithm 1 A simple attack when H is small enough to enumerate.
candidates ← {h1, . . . hH}
while |candidates| > 1 do
Insert random si until collision between some values si and previous sj .
candidates ← {h ∈ candidates : h(si) = h(sj)}
end while
Use h ∈ candidates to determine collisions.
key). Hashes such as Pearson’s hash [12] are in this class. The
attack in this case will recover the permutation, and so the key.
Pearson’s hash has been suggested for use in load balancing,
for example in [13], however this is with a well-known key.
Note this is an extended version of an attack on this hash
which discussed with Pearson [14].
A. The Model
We present the attack on a generalisation of the Pearson
hash. Let G be any finite group, with its operation denoted by
⊗. We have a hash function h, which maps from strings of
elements onto G, defined recursively as follows:
h(s1s2 · · · sn) = T (h(s1s2 · · · sn−1)⊗ sn)
where si ∈ G, T ∈ SG is a permutation of G, and h() = 0 (
denoting the empty string, and 0 the identity of G). Here, the
hash is determined by T , which is an arbitrary permutation of
G, so there are H = |G|! possible hashes.
Pearson’s original hash is obtained by setting G to be the set
{0, 1, · · · , 255} with the group operation ⊗ being xor (i.e. Z82).
However, the attack we will describe will work for any finite
group G, and so we leave G unspecified for this discussion.
This hash accepts arbitrary strings, but our attack only re-
quires the use of fixed length strings. Our aim is to recover the
permutation T , which is unknown to us, by using information
on which strings collide.
B. Attack Description
The attack, which is summarised in Algorithm 2, has several
steps which we will now discuss.
First, we probe with h(x, 0, · · · , 0) and h(0, x, · · · , 0) for
all x ∈ G and identify collisions. That gives us all values of
a, b for which h(a, 0, · · · , 0) = h(0, b, · · · , 0). By applying the
definition of h:
h(a, 0, · · · , 0) = h(0, b, · · · , 0)
⇔ Tn−2(T (a)⊗ 0) = Tn−2(T (0)⊗ b)
⇔ T (a) = T (0)⊗ b
For all a there exists some b which satisfies the above equation,
so if we know T (0) we have determined the value of T (a)
for all a. That is, once we know T (0), we know the entire
permutation. There are |G| different values for T (0), and so
there are |G| possible permutations. This first step has used
2|G| probe strings and, on average, about |G|2/4 comparisons.
Next, we insert h(0, 0, · · · , x) for each x ∈ G. Then we
generate random strings s1s2 · · · sn and insert them. Each
random string will collide with the string 0, 0, · · · , x for
exactly one value of x. After inserting our random string we
know which x matches s1s2 · · · sn. We then test which of each
of the |G| remaining permutation tables permits this collision.
If there is more than one possible table left, we repeat this
with another random string.
How many random strings will we have to insert to identify
the permutation? Each time we test a possible T (0) value
against a collision between a random h(s1s2 · · · sn) and
h(00 · · · 0x), we expect it to match by chance with probability
1/|G|. So, after checking the |G| possible T (0), there will be
exactly one left with probability (1− 1/|G|)|G|−1 = .3686 ≈
1/e, if |G| is large.
After t choices of the random string, we’ve effectively put
each possible T (0) through t tests. All |G|−1 will have been
eliminated on trial some trial between 1, . . . t with probability
(1− (1/|G|)t)|G|−1. Thus, the chance of being eliminated on
exactly trial t is (1− (1/|G|)t)|G|−1− (1− (1/|G|)t−1)|G|−1.
As this probability decreases rapidly in t, we note that the
average number of trials, t¯, required will be small. The number
of comparisons for this phase will be t¯|G|/2.
For Pearson’s original hash, Figure 3 shows the distribution
of t, i.e., the number of random strings required to determine
T for a random sample of 106 different permutations T .
For comparison, we also show the predicted distribution. The
average number of probe strings required to determine the
permutation T per trial was 769.636, which is 3|G| plus
the average number of probes from Figure 3. The number
of comparisons is more widely distributed, between about
13×103 and 21×103, with the mean number of comparisons
16.7× 103, close to the expected value of 16.6× 103.
With this attack, we can create L colliding inputs using just
L + O(3|G|) probe strings. The number of comparisons will
be |G|2/4 + t¯|G|/2.
In this attack we have used several fixed strings. Firstly we
hashed strings of the form a000 . . . 0 and 0b00 . . . 0. In fact,
we could have appended an arbitrary fixed suffix to a0 and 0b,
rather than the all zeros suffix, without changing the attack.
Prepending an arbitrary prefix p makes the attack slightly more
complex, where we end up with relations:
T (X ⊗ a) = T (X)⊗ b
where X = h(p) is unknown. In this case we may parame-
terise T by X and T (X), and then use later stage collisions
to eliminate possibilities. Then, without sending more probes,
Algorithm 2 An attack against Pearson-like Hashes.
Insert (x, 0, . . . , 0) and (0, y, . . . , 0) for x, y ∈ G and note collisions
C ← {(x, y) : h(x, 0, . . . , 0) = h(0, y, . . . , 0)}
candidates ← {T ∈ SG : T (a) = T (b)⊗ T0,∀(a, b) ∈ C, T0 ∈ G}
Insert (0, 0, . . . , x) for x ∈ G.
while |candidates| > 1 do
Insert random s and find x so that h(s) = h(0, 0, . . . , x).
candidates ← {T ∈ candidates : hT (s) = h(0, 0, . . . , x)}
end while
Use h ∈ candidates to determine collisions.
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we may test each possible pair (X,T (X)), to determine which
actually lead to a collision between a000 . . . 0 and 0b00 . . . 0.
This reduces the number of possible remaining hashes to |G|,
and then the attack can continue as if there is no prefix. The
number of comparisons and probes is then the same as for the
attack with no prefix, though some increased local computation
is required.
IV. LINEAR HASHES
In this section we will consider a hash function that is
an unknown linear function. An example of this hash is the
Toeplitz function, recommended as part of Microsoft’s Receive
Side Scaling for network cards [1]. Here, a random Toeplitz
matrix is used as the key for the hash function. The input
strings are of size 64, 96, 256 or 288 bits, depending on the
use of IPv4/IPv6 and the availability of layer-4 port numbers.
The output is between 2 and 128 buckets, that is 1 to 7 bits.
Note that before the output is used, it is looked up in an array
to map the hash output to a CPU. We will consider the hash
without this indirection table initially, and then consider how
to attack the hash with the indirection table.
Some common unkeyed hash functions are linear (e.g. the
IPSX hash in [10]), and this technique could also be used to
identify collisions for them.
A. The Model
In this section we consider a hash function h which is an
unknown linear function h : Zn2 → Zm2 over Z2. The attack we
will describe can be generalised to homomorphisms between
other groups.
B. The Attack
The steps of this attack are summarised in Algorithm 3.
Let E = {e1, . . . , ek} be a linearly independent subset of Zn2 ,
representing bits we can vary. Now, by probing, say, h(x +
e1), . . . , h(x + ek) we get a partition of E into E1, . . . , El
so that all the members of Ei collide. This requires k probe
strings and on average kl/2 comparisons.
Now we may choose even-sized subsets of each of Ei, say
E′1, . . . E
′
l and consider
h
⎛
⎝x+ ∑
e∈
⋃
E′
i
e
⎞
⎠ = h(x) + ∑
e∈
⋃
E′
i
h(e) = h(x),
because pairs from the same E′i will cancel. We may choose
the E′i in 2
|Ei|−1 ways, and each choice will give a different
input
∑
e∈
⋃
E′
i
e because the set E is linearly independent.
Thus we have generated
2|E1|−1 × . . .× 2|El|−1 = 2|E1|+...+|El|−l = 2k−l
collisions by using k + 2k−l probes and kl/2 comparisons.
Note, the largest that l may be is 2m, the number of
output buckets. This gives a lower bound of 2k−2
m
collisions.
Suppose we control 64 bits of the input string and we are
assigning inputs among 16 = 24 resources (maybe CPUs or
routes), then this leads to 264−16 = 248 collisions. However,
if m is large, then this lower bound can be very pessimistic.
We can get an alternative estimate by observing that if we
throw k balls into 2m urns, then the average number of urns
with balls will be a = 2m
(
1− (1− 1
2m
)k)
. Heuristically, we
expect around 2k−a collisions, though this will not be exact
because we are substituting the average of l rather than using
its distribution.
For example, consider a linear hash with 6 output bits, or
64 output buckets1. We consider how the attack performs as
1We choose 6 output bits because it gives a reasonable spread of outputs,
but also allows us to conduct a comparison with the non-linear indirection
table in the next section. Our results generalise to other output sizes.
Algorithm 3 An attack against Linear Hashes.
E = {e1, . . . , ek}.
Partition E into E1, . . . El by inserting and noting collisions.
for all E1‘ ⊂ E1, . . . , El‘ ⊂ El and |Ei‘| even do
Insert
∑
e∈
⋃
E′
i
e.
end for
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Fig. 4. Attacking a hash with 64 outputs with a variable number of input
bits. Mean lookup time for 100,000 inserted strings.
the number of basis vectors k used by the attacker varies.
Figure 4 shows the mean object lookup time when we insert
105 strings. If the above method produces fewer than 105
strings, we continue by using random strings, until 105 strings
have been inserted. The results shown are averages over 103
different Toeplitz matrices.
As expected, the attack performs well against the hash once
a moderate number of bits are available to the attacker. For
comparison, we show the mean lookup time when strings are
uniformly distributed over the buckets, which demonstrates
how effective the attack can be. We also show our lower bound
and heuristic estimate for the mean lookup time. We see that
the lower bound is quite conservative, but the heuristic gives
a reasonable indication of when the attack becomes effective.
C. Modified Attack
We now consider the case where the linear function is
composed with an ‘indirection table’ — a further mapping
which reduces the range of the hash to something suitable for
a particular application (for example, assignment of packets
to processors [1]).
If the indirection table is linear, then the composition of the
hash function and the indirection table will also be linear. In
this case, we can still use the attack described above. However,
if the indirection table is not linear, our previous attack will
be less effective — now the composition of the hash function
and the indirection table is not linear, and our attack requires
linearity to combine inputs.
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For example, consider the situation tested in the previous
section. Now the linear part of our hash outputs 7 bits, but
using an indirection table we map this to 6 bits (again 64
buckets). As was said above, if the indirection table is linear,
we are in the situation described shown in Figure 4. So instead
assume the indirection table is not linear, and is instead a
randomly generated mapping. Figure 5 shows how the mean
lookup time changes in this case. We see that this significantly
weakens the attack, though more collisions are generated than
we would expect if the strings were uniformly distributed.
In some situations, we can improve the attack, even with a
nonlinear indirection table. We are interested in the inputs that
collide in the linear component of the hash function, and not
those that collide in the non-linear indirection table. We can
distinguish between these two cases by exploiting the fact that
in practice the indirection table may change regularly; indeed,
this is suggested as a method of load balancing for RSS. We
first insert a set of strings, as before. We identify the collisions,
and then we wait for the indirection table to change. We then
insert these strings again, and record the collisions. Those
strings that collide in both tests are likely to be collisions
in the linear hash. We then continue with the attack as
originally described. Figure 5 shows the effectiveness of this
modified attack. We see that the attack regains much of its
previous effectiveness. By observing collisions for more than
two indirection tables, the attack could be further improved.
While we have described these attacks for Zm2 , a group
where all elements have order 2, similar attacks could be
conducted on groups with higher order elements. If h was
a homomorphism between groups H and G and and d is
a number such that gd is always the identity, then we can
perform the same attack by choosing subsets of Ei which
have a number of elements divisible by d. Instead of linear
independence of E we would want a set with a small number
of group relations. However, the effectiveness of this attack is
reduced as d increases, because the number of subsets with a
multiple of d elements decreases rapidly. Groups with a larger
d are subject to other attacks, such as noting that for colliding
inputs x, y and that h(N(x − y)) = 0 for integers N (e.g.
advanced hash flooding [15]).
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown how collisions between strings
or objects can be used to identify which hash function h from
a family of hash function H is in use. If the hash functions
themselves are not collision resistant, this leaves the system
open to algorithmic complexity attacks. We have discussed
how finding collisions may be possible in practice.
For three cases, we demonstrate attacks. In the first case, the
set of hash functions is small, and we can simply enumerate
via collisions found using the birthday paradox. In the second
case, the key indexing the hash function is a permutation, and
so the large number of permutations (e.g. 256! of one byte)
means the hashes are not subject to enumeration. However,
for Pearson-like hashes we show how the permutation can be
discovered using a relatively small number of tests, and then
collisions can easily be generated.
We then consider hash functions that are linear, particularly
with respect to xor. We show how to identify collisions for
these hash functions, even without explicitly identifying the
function. This attack can also be extended if a time-varying
nonlinear part is present. While this attack can be extended
to other groups, it is less effective for groups with a large
index. For example, the Carter-Wegman families of universal
hash discussed in [6] are linear, but modulo a large prime, and
so the elements have a large index. However, attacks against
these functions when used as part of a MAC [16], [17] are
likely to generalise to the situation considered here.
The abstract attack that we presented at the start of this
paper, determining a hash function from a family using colli-
sions, can be applied to almost any family of functions. While
we have identified some general conditions that should be
avoided (e.g. the size of the family being small with respect to
the number of outputs or the functions being homomorphisms
over groups with small index elements), it would be interesting
to establish if there are conditions that can provide some
guarantees that identifying the hash or colliding inputs is
hard. Another option is to design cryptographic-strength hash
functions that are computationally less expensive, e.g. SipHash
[15].
An alternative would be to look at methods for changing
the hash function, either periodically or when an attack is
suspected. As we show in Section IV-C, if this is not done
carefully, it can open the system to more effective attacks.
The nature of the techniques applicable in this situation will
vary from application to application. For example, for routing
packets it may be acceptable to change the hash function from
time to time, as the exact route that packets take through the
network is usually not important as long as packet reordering is
uncommon. However, if we are assigning HTTP flows to load-
balanced web servers, then reassignment of existing flows will
usually break the connection, which will usually be considered
unacceptable. However, there still may be general lessons to
be learned regarding how detection, timing and rehashing can
be performed in this context.
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